hola que tal Raven Guttentag estas Almonte Posca windy now we wind about that in Durham and even kristef Iike Sarah and Angliss or madam the food or de ropa the sprays de esta Chrissy EU forum analysts in Rio supe – Jean cattle a sheikah Paso a villa present seo-yeon unless he moderates personal dress and we’re here with even kristef and I am sure they work a and the director for global foresight and analysis at the Open Society Foundations and even kristef who’s joining us from Bulgaria today is a fellow and the Institute for human sciences in Vienna the chairman of the Centre for liberal studies in Sofia and the co-author together with different homes of the book light that fail a reckoning amongst other which was probably amongst others refurbished last year and even good morning thanks for joining us from Sofia today we’re going to be discussing this longer-term vision of the crisis not the current event so much as where this may be living the world and in particular Europe and I guess to start the conversation I wouldn’t I would perhaps make a reference to this endless cycle of crisis in Europe because we have been on a crisis mode for years now and I guess the we should perhaps start seeing why and how these is different crises and why and how this connects to the previous ones first great pleasure being in conversation with you and paradoxically I do believe this crisis is also the second coming of the three of the previous crisis if you see basically the outcomes at the same time very much revising some of the policy outcomes if you compare this ways for example the response to the terrorist attacks that swept some of the West European countries in the 21st century you’re going to see that some of the emergency situation and those three extraordinary measures taken by the government’s now are kind of a much stronger version to this type of responses that we have to the terrorist crisis if you woke to the financial crisis of 2008 2009 2010 now all the economists are going to agree that this is the second coming of the economic crisis and this one is going to be much more devastating than the previous one according to the latest data that they have seen the decline of production and the GDP in places like Germany or France is going to be the worst in all post-world War two periods and certainly if you talk about the refugee crisis we are going basically to see that this crisis manage to post much more borders the end the refugee crisis did particularly between the EU Member States so from this point if this became the culmination of a crisis decade which was facing the European Union with some basic questions of how it can function and what is the similarity between the EU member states but this time all these three crisis came in a package of one it is much stronger and from this point of view also my claim is going to be that if in the previous crisis you can hope that when the crisis is over the world can go back where it was this time it is much more difficult to expect that the solution of this crisis is simply going to be the restoration of a certain type of a pre crisis normality and in my view there is just to give you one argument why I do believe this one is going to be much more transformative for good or for bad than the previous crisis this by the way is not a crisis that was unpredictable it is enough to read the national intelligence report of the American intelligence community from 2004 in order to see that the risk of a pandemic which is going to produce the total global disruption was very much predicted it’s enough to listen to Bill Gates that talk of 2013 to see him basically telling that what happened was going to happen but nevertheless it was predictable but it was still unimaginable and one of the things that happened now is after this several weeks in which we are living in a totally different world is that many people

start would yes some big palm to the climate change crisis we need planes to be landed some of the big polluter to be be closed but even people who are booked easily very quickly and then sir Adam will Lincoln outfit looters are closed and at the same time for many of the right-wing populists they have been talking that we should restore the borders between the European Union member states that the freedom of movement should be over but even when they were saying this they never believed it because we are so much used to this type of open borders world and that’s suddenly now we’re living in the world in which the borders between the Member States are closed so from this point to do I expect the kind of invasion of radicalism with different colors and from different direction in the public debate yeah and I think it’s interesting that that you know even even for those who were prepared for the crisis it for the first wave of the cash which is the pandemic they cannot be shelter for the second wave of the crisis which is the the massive economic downturn right because if you look at the Taiwan or you know Hong Kong or even Canada which had actually a bit of a SARS outbreak in 2007 those countries were prepared for the pandemic they did quite a good job and they will continue to do quite a good job and that still will not shelter them from the global transformations because the world is going to change not not just because of the pandemic but around the pandemic that has generated all these transformations and I think we would you say about the theme the continuity shows very clearly also in the framing so for example I think today I saw this statistic about the German public opinion where 45% of the German public opinion things that or agrees that the the crisis and the extent of the crisis is at least partly the fault of the bad governance in Italy and Spain and only 22 percent disagree and and that’s something probably that could would not have happened if this public was not completely primed to think about the quality of governance in Italy and Spain for the last 15 years right and they are all of the sudden and something new happens and yes Spain and Italy probably partly due to governance but probably also through bad luck that the crisis arrived there before then in the US for example find themselves as the epicenters and it’s interesting how the old frames of the previous crisis are so strong and resilient that they are framing the interpretation of facts and I guess one of the questions is for how long we will be interpreting the crisis with the old frames of reference and when will there be new frames of reference not another group I talk too often is activists on digital rights and the initial reaction was this is terrible we cannot have all the civilians and when all the evidence coming from Asia was that actually serve aliens and apps and all these things had helped they are in shock and they are really trying to see how could you create these space to do things differently in the space of using technology because without technology it’s going to be much harder to contain the situation so one one of the phenomena that I’m seeing in this crisis and I and I am really worried about this it’s not only the good old confirmation bias right so everyone of course enters the crisis and says you know before you the most important thing is bad governance instance how the Europe that’s going to be your interpretation if for you the most important thing is gender equality you’re going to say this confirms everything I’ve been saying about the care economy in gender equality and if we do do is climate change then you will have the confirmation that you can do this thing so everyone enters with confirmation bias this is human the problem is how early everyone starts to adjust to the paradigm of what’s happening to a crisis it may look superficially like some things are the same thing as in the past but ok actually it’s radically different it’s also radically different because this is

the first of the big crisis that hits the three big big engines of the global economy at the same time right and it’s hitting sometimes it has happened that that that Europe has been in a bad shape Asia has been in a bad shape to you North America has been in a bad shape but all of them at the same time and all of them with revealing deep problems in governance that’s new and if we just interpret things as business as usual or at least as this is the world we know this is problematic I think one one aspect you mentioned perhaps you can talk a little bit more about this is how the return of borders but also the return of of government big time that of people looking at government in some ways I I do the analogy with old epidemics where people turned to the church even when it was obviously the church did not have the solution right now people are turning to the government even where it’s obvious that the government does not have the solution or the tools right and so in this way people turning to government and then government having to in fact admit that it’s it’s to a certain extent important is is important but on the other hand it’s an opening it’s an opening for a very different relationship between the state and the economy and the state and the individual and and I’m interesting I’m interested to see whether this is going to be a permanent feature or whether this is part of the emergency I don’t know how you cities even listen first I I find very very important what you said that this time our confirmation biases could be our words the guidance through the crisis because normally people with stronger ideological beliefs they look at every crisis as an opportunity the famous saying that no crisis should be wasted but when you say this you’re not interested in the crisis you’re just interested in the crisis is an instrument to promote the agenda that have been with you before the crisis and I too believe that there is psychologically one major difference between this crisis and the previous crisis for example the refugee crisis of the economic crisis and psychologically I do believe that the previous crisis were very much based on anxiety of course we fear certain things but we fear certain things because we feel intellectually dislocated we don’t understand the world how it is functioning certain types of expectations about the world particularly the globalized world have collapsed and as a result of it people became very anxious this crisis is not basically rooted at anxiety this crisis is rooted in fear you know what you fear you feel being infected you fear that if you go to hospital they are not going to be a bad for you it is the fear that basically you can die and on one level this is much existencial II well much more important because we had been confronted against with our own mortality or modern culture in the West for the last decades was trying to make us believe that this is something unnatural even when a very old person is dying normally we’re going to ask was this a doctor’s mistake was it an accident it was so difficult for us basically to live with the idea that being mortal is at the heart of the human existence and now we confront it with this and this basically getting all of us out of our comfort zones essentially and not simply politically or economically so from this point of view it’s a very very different and also I do believe that nevertheless that all these crises very much repeat some of the previous crises if you see the policy response you’re going to see little bit different generally make the biggest spendings in its post-world War two history the way they respond to this crisis is very different in the way there is responded to the financial crisis of 2008 2009 but for the moment they decided to spend on their own economy and this is the interesting story about this crisis because borders in our because our political imagination is very much shaped and framed by the 20th century so we are very much used to terms to think in terms of wars or revolutions but if you see the history of borders you’re going to see that borders who is extremely important institutions exactly when it comes of containing infections and epidemics it was in the Year 1711 when the Habsburg monarchy decided to create a very well protected although is the Ottoman Empire from where many of these infections coming and they have a current piece for

everybody entering for two weeks which is not much different the Hawtrey is saying today it was eighteenth century and as a result of it I do believe that the initial reaction to this crisis was natural confinement and going back to the borders I’m calling did a state home nationalism which I by the way find very distinctive then the ethnic nationalism which was triggered by refugee crisis this is not about basically vulgarians against the world war hungarians against the world paradoxically for the government this nationalism is much more territorial and the government basically make it clear that they taking care of everybody who is on the territory of the country because you cannot simply separate people the interesting story with the infection is that this infection is quite egalitarian one this is not like whole area or other type of infections that go to a certain part of population normally the poor part of the population here everybody including Boris Johnson can be affected so as a result of it you basically should take care for everybody who is on your territory and for example if some of the Bulgarians can decided to stay in Spain for the crisis then the spanish government should take care of them and this is very clear that I believe this is very important that this nationalism was strong but this nationalism was different but this is only the first part of the crisis the second part of the crisis when it’s becoming much more economic is going to be that this type of a natural attachment to the borders is going to backfire because most of these countries are very much export oriented they’re part of a bigger and much more European or global supply chains so they’re going to understand the team we need to decide to open your economy keep your borders closed your dad and I doubly from this point of view paradoxically when it comes to two major issue nationalism and populism we still don’t know who’s going to benefit from this crisis because populist benefited very much from the state of anxiety but what we see today is out of the fear that came oh is this crisis it was dozing governments that benefited most nevertheless losing government by the way because people wanted to trust the government if you think they don’t trust the government exactly your example is the religion and with the nationalism it was the first intuitive reaction I don’t know how it’s going to look in two or three mouths when people really realize that is not easily that they can move but even you you said this this is an egalitarian epidemic and and it’s interesting because it isn’t it isn’t I was reading about the colonial treatment of epidemics and in colonial times you know there were there were quite a few epidemics in number of places of Kenya India other places and basically the preoccupation of the government was that Europeans would not be affected and the economy would not stop right in a way Europeans are now the ones bringing the disease right it’s the rich who are mobile who travel business travels tourists people in cruise ships those are the ones bringing the diseases to places but what happens in a place like India or a place like Africa is very different first of all because they react copying the solutions in the industrialized nations but of course in a place where 80% of the economy is informal this is totally bogus right so everyone is told to stay at home which means starving and which means that these people live in another planet so they are taking measures that are in another planet they are treating this infectious disease but you know India has more tuberculosis than any other country in the world or South Africa’s also a tuberculosis rate all of the sudden these people say you know why is this different this disease which is no more infectious than the other this is killing us affecting the our governments so different and so it’s interesting because the fact that the epidemic touches the elites doesn’t always bring the elites close to people sometimes in some places it brings them further away because people say well we are already dying or infectious disease so what what are you saying why is it so different that I now cannot just go and make a living so I think there will be these locations precisely because the epidemic now is heating it in our places in our countries it’s hitting everyone equally but in other places is actually going to be hitting the urban mobile rich middle class at least initially more

I I also wanted to to go back to your idea about the nationalization or initialisation of economy and and I hey I think it’s it’s going to be perhaps lasting not the nationalization as I agree completely with you it’s impossible to go back to the old economic models with the expectations that everyone now has about the economy but but I think some regionalization was already going on there was an America in particular a very strong pressure to stop being so dependent on China and now the realization that we cannot produce chloroquine because two or three of the essential components are made in India and China and no one else is making them for example right that’s that’s bringing a certain realization that you know it’s okay to depend from the Czech Republic but it’s maybe not okay to depend on India or China for the number of the basic returns and also just practical so I think there is some big globalization going to happen which may not take the form of pure national borders but perhaps somewhere in between that that looks to me like like like a possible outcome it also would connect with the idea of less mobility and less kind of flying people and things around the world in in big amounts and it’s also interesting going and going back about your comments on populism it’s also interesting to observe that this time the the national populist in many places are in government you are saying that thrive on anxiety but I also try one opposition right they thrive on just making noise but not taking responsibility but here is you know Modi in in the here is also Niro in Brazil here is Trump in America and they will they will try to deflect the blame of course and lemak on everyone else and and which we’re seeing now try I’m talking about the the World Health Organization and China and everyone else but ultimately it’s not going to be as easy as it was in 2010 to just blame the state to school the Washington establishment the brussels elites because because first of all the big decisions are being taken a national level and second they’re being they can buy them in many cases and and so it’s it’s it’s difficult to see there is there is this rallying around the flag in every country whoever is in government the left the right populace the centrists that’s that makes no difference but we also know that this this effect doesn’t last that it is a temporary effect and then in the long run this government will be judged by by their performance so it’s interesting because now citizens sitting at home are comparing two different things one is its authoritarian governance more effective or less effective right and the other thing that they are comparing is is this populism more effective than the whole style kind of expert let you know centrist politics and and and I’m not sure that the answers will be the same for every field at the same time so people may may think it’s actually better to have an authoritarian government to control the epidemic but it’s a disaster for the economic recover or they may say you know this populist are patterns of the beginning they seemed useless but at least they got the economy back on their feet so I I would I am very cautious about making too early some shion’s about who will be the winner and it’s you know if had had we made this forecast in February which have been very wrong would in April but maybe maybe July it will look very different listen it’s very difficult to try about the to talk about the post-war situation when the war is not over and when you know who is winning but already there two or three things that at least at this stage I do believe that we can see one is that the distinctions build the governments and authoritarian governments on the base of the response of this crisis is not easy to be made by the way governments very different political regimes are adopting a very similar policies and later I am trying to give at least my reading why they do this so if you see who is doing best in dealing with the crisis you’re going to see the democratic countries like South Korea are doing as efficiently as somebody like Singapore

which is also Italian kind of authoritarian regime there was an American scholar who tried to basically figure out how this democracy of Italian opposition works and it shows that basically the nature of the political regime is not a great factor when it is basically going to define neither the efficiency the response and by the way neither the measures of the response we like to talk about surveillance being typical for China but now the level of using this type of apps and surveillance is also very much typical for a democratic country like Israel so from this point of view this is the worst moment to try to claim that out of the distance is going to be a victory of a political system on the other side of course China could have a problem on its own because while president rum of course basically trying to blame them for everything that is coming but there was today in the Washington Post an interesting report based on the Chinese journalists showing that it’s quite clear that China was covering for quite a long time the spread of the disease and basically the data of the people that has died and probably this also affected the response of the other countries and then comes the second question which was a very interesting question that you asked well such different ways such different countries in the world with such a different demography of their population with so different economies by reacting in a such a similar ways why everybody go is the social distancing who is the log-house why they’re doing this and I do believe that one of the entry think way to answer it is to go to this important distinctions that American economist Frank Knight made already back in 1921 just the day after the Spanish fool and he basically said listen there is a major difference of taking a decision in a state of unmeasurable uncertainty in which you basically know nothing you don’t have a data you don’t know how it is spreading and the usual risk which please which with governments of companies do every day so in the moment of an unmeasurable uncertainty first you always working with the worst case scenario and you have a good reasons to do what the others are doing not because they drink it right because you don’t want to be accused the next day that you didn’t do what you get done so from this point of view this is a very much self-protection of the governments so they decided to do what the other governments doing nevertheless the situation in their country could be very different I told if this is going to start to change who is the more governments are going to have first more data what is happening in their own societies but secondly having the political resistance coming from the population but for the moment according to these American colleagues that I was quoting there’s three factors that best describes the efficiency of the response to the coronavirus first is the lessons words from the previous epidemics it’s not by accident that countries like South Korea Singapore or Taiwan or Canada but has their SARS experienced were better prepared and they will start in testing immediately and they were much more decisive than anybody else because they’ve learned how to deal with this the second is the levels of social trust and I do believe this is a very important point that the colleague is making because she said listen you cannot keep people in homes simply by repression people should trust their governments to stay home and from this point of view you have a kind of a high social trust regimes like the Chinese ones and like a German one it’s two totally different political system but according to this theory it’s both of those countries are quite high trust their governments are they doing what they’re told to do and on the other side it’d be ticking places three where the social trust government I mean is quite low this probably explains the fact that in places like Delano and others the local people decided that what government is telling them should not be taken seriously and the circus deficiency bureaucracy and you made a very good point that the Germans are saying okay this is a bad governance in places like Spain or eat this crisis you’re going to end up with two type of a countries once who became very self-confident and proud of the efficiency of their governments and German is very much about this today because they have a lot of infections very low level of people dying and basically they have the feeling that they’re doing well and then you have a countries in which it even does not need to be the most difficult countries like Spain or Italy but even in places like Romania 14% of all infected people are medical workers so you basically have a major failure of the government to protect the people on the front lines and I do believe that if there is a dictatorship that is functioning in the world today

this is the dictatorship of comparisons every night everybody is not just watching what is happening in their own country they are watching what is happening in the u.s. what is happening in Spain what is happening in Italy how the Swedish experiment is going to do so paradoxically in our understanding of the world we are much more globalized then we have been before strangely enough this kind of a crisis brought everybody home but made Cosmopolitan’s out of everybody staying home very good yeah I think I think the this tyranny of comparison works also in unexpected ways so you you were you were mentioning the difference between South Korea being more democratic and and Singapore being less democratic let’s say at the same time the use of apps in Singapore is much more consented by people and in South Korea has been much more invasive of privacy so interestingly what we what we are seeing is that the practices are very different from what the nominal government is saying after all you know it’s much more oppressive the approach in Europe of stopping everyone from going to the street than the approach in Singapore or in other places that we see as more authoritarian so it will also make us re-examine perhaps there the limits of who we see as more democratic less democratic more open less open and if we are ready to to interrogate our our assumptions because as we were saying before this this is this has been a moment at least when everyone was looking for confirmation and reaffirmation of their ideology we will now see how these changes even we’re not doing at that time basically for our conversation today perhaps just the last sentence about the European Union and the new tensions do you imagine this all this crisis having in a way converged into this one may lead to solving some of the bottlenecks to kind of breaking some of the molds and moving forward or do you think we are at a moment where we really go coming closer to this integration or at least the not not the disintegrate at least less integrated for me I don’t know in which direction will go the only thing that at least my intuition is that after every of the previous crisis we could have hoped that we can simply muddle through we believe that without kind of a radical changes we can keep the European Union function of the way it is and what I do believe make this crisis different is that either we’re going to move to a much more radical less Europe or more Europe but we are not going to basically present the European Union simply preserving the policies that we see today I agree and I think we have not even talked about these but there’s one desk a twitch test schedule is economics another taste test case it’s borders a third test case is Hungary and whether the the new authoritarian experiment really consolidates or hangry goes it has to go back not just to normal in terms of pandemics but also to normal in terms of European norms and values very good thanks so much for this conversation and thanks everyone for joining us in this conversation today thank you very much it was my pleasure

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